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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops, through a simulation model, a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between transportation infrastructure strategy development frameworks and system performance. 
A strategy development framework for transportation can be characterized by the infrastructure 
ownership structures, cross-modal and cross-sectoral linkages, revenue sources, resource 
allocation decision-making processes, and geographic scales of the organizations responsible for 
making infrastructure investments. Taking the dimensions of a strategy development framework 
as inputs, the model simulates investments in an infrastructure network over time—in this paper, 
the national intercity roadway network of Portugal. The results demonstrate the value of using 
simulation models of complex transportation systems to inform the decisions of not only 
planners but also of stakeholders who design strategy development frameworks. Such a tool is 
particularly important given the ongoing reorganizations of the Portuguese transportation sector, 
including increasing reliance on concession agreements, highway tolls, and sub-national 
government participation.
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INTRODUCTION 
Transportation infrastructure system users, operators, planners, and owners constitute a set of 
distinct stakeholders, each making strategic decisions and investments toward fulfilling its own 
objectives for system performance. Ultimately, however, transportation system performance is a 
function of interactions among and decisions taken by all stakeholders. These interactions 
complicate efforts at large-scale infrastructure planning (e.g., for metropolitan areas or countries) 
and prediction of future system characteristics and performance. 
For purposes of this research, we call the environment within which interactions and 
decisions among organizations occur the strategy development framework. A strategy 
development framework for transportation can be characterized by the infrastructure ownership 
structures, cross-modal and cross-sectoral linkages, revenue sources, resource allocation 
decision-making processes, and geographic scales of the organizations responsible for making 
infrastructure investments. While strategy development frameworks can be evaluated to a modest 
extent by inspection (or by “common sense”), we can more easily measure and evaluate the 
relative performance of the transportation systems they produce. 
This paper develops, through a simulation model, a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between strategy development frameworks and system performance. Taking the 
parameters of a strategy development framework as inputs, the model simulates investments in 
an infrastructure network over time—a network (in this paper, the national intercity roadway 
network of Portugal) whose simulated performance we can measure. The results demonstrate the 
value of using simulation models of complex transportation systems to inform the decisions of 
not only planners but also of stakeholders who design strategy development frameworks. We 
offer direction for further refinement and development of this simulation approach as well as 
thoughts on future research in this area. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The identification, definition, characterization, and simulation of strategy development 
frameworks in this research builds upon past efforts to understand complex systems. While 
complexity has long been present in natural and engineering environments, its formal scientific 
study moved forward quickly in the mid-20th century. In that era, Simon defined a complex 
system as one “made up a number of parts that interact in a non-simple way” such that “it is not a 
trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole” (1). Reductionist approaches, therefore, must 
maintain a holistic view of the system in question. 
Nightingale and Rhodes offer enterprise architecture as a framework for characterizing 
and understanding complex systems, comprising eight “views”: strategy, organization, 
information, knowledge, services, products, processes, and policy (2). Their framework specifies 
methods for evaluating an enterprise according to these views, and how to approach transitions 
to the architecture in pursuit of future desired states, but for a single organization such as a 
company. 
Transportation systems as with other complex systems, however, comprise many 
organizations and many stakeholders, which introduces evaluative complexity (stakeholders have 
competing views of “good” performance) and nested complexity (organizational layers and 
physical layers of a complex system interact in unpredictable ways). Sussman, et al. introduced 
the notion of Complex, Large-scale, Interconnected, Open, Socio-technical (CLIOS) Systems 
and applied the CLIOS Process (for representation, evaluation, and implementation of changes to 
CLIOS Systems) to a number of contexts, including transportation systems (3). Although the 
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CLIOS Process provides a guiding framework for capturing various types of complexity, it is not 
tied to any particular qualitative or quantitative approaches. 
Our approach, an agent-based simulation model, follows the CLIOS Process by relating 
the organizational layers of a complex system (i.e., the strategy development framework) to the 
physical layers (i.e., the transportation system). Previous such efforts in the transportation arena 
are relatively sparse, although agent-based models have been used for a variety of other purposes 
in transportation, particularly to simulate traffic and to forecast travel demand (e.g., 4, 5, 6). 
More recently, Xie and Levinson developed a model of infrastructure network evolution that has 
a similar structure as the model presented here, viewing the network as an emergent outcome of 
a variety of interactions, including organizations’ responses to economic and political forces (7). 
They observed the long-term construction and evolution of a hypothetical network beginning 
with few links under various frameworks, but considered principally changes in the degree of 
centralization of investment decision control. 
The model presented in this paper builds on past efforts by considering in an integrated 
fashion the impact of the various parameters that compose a strategy development framework on 
system performance. Additionally, we execute the simulation using data from the real, largely-
built Portuguese intercity highway network. In the following sections we describe the 
characteristics of a strategy development framework, the simulation model structure, and the 
results, which help us to understand more clearly the relationship between a framework and 
system performance. 
 
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
To allow a more tractable, systematic description of a strategy development framework, we 
decompose it into seven dimensions as illustrated in Figure 1a. Characterization of a particular 
instance of a strategy development framework is accomplished by selecting a discrete value or 
combination of values along each of these dimensions, as shown in the figure and as described 
below: 
 Ownership structure: state-owned enterprise (SOE) and concession 
 Revenue sources: general taxes and user fees 
 Revenue level: any value selected from a continuous or discrete spectrum (e.g., high-
medium-low) 
 Resource allocation criterion: net present value (NPV), benefit-cost ratio (BCR), and 
financial internal rate of return (IRR) 
 Geographic scale: link-based, municipal (232 municipalities), national-municipal hybrid, 
regional (5 regions), and national (note that these geographic scales are specific to the 
context of Portugal as illustrated in Figure 1b; “national” corresponds to the mainland 
territory of Portugal) 
 Degree of modal integration: uni-modal and multi-modal 
 Degree of sectoral integration: integrated and unintegrated 
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FIGURE 1 – (a) Strategy Development Framework and (b) Illustration of Alternative 
Geographic Scales in Portugal 
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By combining all the possible values (and combinations of values) along each dimension, 
it is possible to characterize several thousand distinct alternative strategy development 
frameworks. Some of these frameworks approximate those observed in real contexts; however, 
most are hypothetical, while many are altogether infeasible, either logically or technologically. 
By making judgments about the logical, technological, and/or practical feasibility of the various 
alternatives, we down-selected 105 frameworks to study in further detail using the simulation 
model. The model is described next.1 Examples of the frameworks selected for further 
examination (8 of the 105) are shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 – Examples of Strategy Development Frameworks Simulated (8 out of 105) 
Geographic 
Scale 
Ownership 
Structure 
Revenue 
Type 
Revenue 
Level 
Resource 
allocation criterion 
National SOE Tax High BCR 
Regional SOE Tax-Toll Mix Low NPV 
Hybrid SOE Tax Low BCR 
Municipal SOE Toll Medium BCR 
Link-Based Concession Toll Low IRR 
National Concession Toll High IRR 
Link-Based SOE Tax High BCR 
Regional SOE Tax High NPV  
 
SIMULATION STRUCTURE 
The simulation model is conceptually an agent-based model, which includes four components: 
an environment, rules, agents, and outputs (8). The simulation comprises five modules as 
illustrated in Figure 2 and as described below. In agent-based modeling terms, the environment 
is represented by Portuguese population demographics, the physical infrastructure network, and 
travel demand (modules 1-3), rules are reflected in the project evaluation and investment 
strategy decision processes (modules 4-5), agents are defined as the entities (government 
agencies or private companies) that decide investment strategies (module 5), and the outputs 
include a set of investment decisions (module 5) and an updated infrastructure network (module 
2). 
1. The demographic data module contains population data for each municipality in 
mainland Portugal for the years 1995-2008. 
2. The network module is a collection of 375 links (highway segments) and 232 nodes 
(municipalities) describing the intercity highway network in Portugal. 
3. The travel demand module assigns trips to each link in the network based on the 
definition of the network from the network module and population information from the 
demographic module. 
4. The project evaluation module determines the benefits, costs, and other impacts 
associated with various proposed projects based on inputs from the travel demand 
module. 
5. The investment strategy module uses information from the project evaluation module 
together with budget constraints to select projects for implementation. 
                                               
1 Note that in the simulation model, we consider only uni-modal and sectorally unintegrated strategy development 
frameworks. 
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FIGURE 2 – Model Structure 
 
Each run through these modules represents one year in time. Although the simulation 
could run for any number of years, we chose 14 years based on availability of data. In the 
following subsections, we discuss each module in detail. 
 
Demographic Module 
The demographic module contains population data for each municipality in mainland Portugal 
for the years 1995-2008. Data were obtained from Portugal’s National Statistics Institute, which 
maintains census data as well as annual population estimates (9). In 2008, there were 278 
municipalities in mainland Portugal ranging in population from 1,714 (Barrancos) to 494,631 
(Lisbon). The average population was 36,443, and the median population was 16,369. For 
modeling purposes, some municipalities were merged and treated as a single node. In addition, 5 
external zones were added to represent municipalities in neighboring Spain with important 
highway connections to Portugal. After making these adjustments, the demographic module 
contains 232 municipalities. 
 
Network Module 
The network module is a database describing the intercity highway infrastructure network in 
Portugal. We define the network as the collection of nodes (municipalities) and the links 
(highway segments) that connect them. For purposes of this modeling exercise, we omit other 
travel modes. Although rail and air are available in a few intercity corridors in Portugal, highway 
remains the dominant choice; for the top ten domestic city pairs, only 6% of trips are by rail and 
less than 1% by air (10). 
The starting point for the simulation model is 1995, near the start of an era of major 
infrastructure upgrades in Portugal and three years prior to the publication of the National 
Roadway Plan (Plano Rodoviária Nacional, or PRN) (11). Constructing an accurate 
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representation of the highway system as it existed in 1995 is based on review of contemporary 
maps, historical maps, satellite imagery, and official documentation of highway investments 
from the state-owned highway company Estradas de Portugal (EP), concessionaires, and 
Google’s map service (12). 
The PRN defines three categories of intercity highways in Portugal: principal routes 
(IPs), complementary routes (ICs), and national roads (ENs). All 9 IPS, all 34 ICs, and a 
majority of the ENs (90 out of 170) are included in the network module. Each of these highways 
is broken into segments, or links, drawn to connect municipalities. In all, there are 375 links, 341 
of which existed in 1995. The remaining 34 are in the PRN and are represented in the 1995 
network as “proposed” links. Each link is two-way and has the following characteristics. 
 Terrain. Terrain takes one of the following values: flat, hilly, or mountainous. 
 Land Use. Land use takes one of the following values: urban, suburban or rural. 
 Length. Length of the path (travel distance) followed between two nodes, measured in 
kilometers. 
 Design speed. Links can have a design speed of 60, 90, or 120 kilometers per hour (kph). 
Links with a design speed of 120 kph represent motorways (IPs and some ICs); links with a 
design speed of 90 kph design represent non-motorway ICs; links with a design speed of 60 
kph represent ENs. 
 Number of lanes. The number of lanes of any link is identical in both directions and takes a 
nonnegative integer value (unbuilt-but-proposed links have 0 lanes). 
 Capacity. The capacity of a link is reflected in passenger cars per hour per lane (pcphpl) in 
each direction. Capacity is a function of the speed according to the relationship defined in 
the Highway Capacity Manual (13). 
 
Travel Demand Module 
The travel demand module predicts the volume of travel on each link in the intercity highway 
network of Portugal, drawing on data from the network and demographic modules. This is 
accomplished using a simplified aggregate 4-step model, with trip generation and distribution 
based on a traditional Zipf gravity function of the form (14): 
 
b
ij
ji
ij C
PP
aT  , where 
Tij = total number of trips from municipality i to municipality j. 
Pi = number of inhabitants of municipality i 
Pj = number of inhabitants of municipality j 
Cij = shortest-path free-flow travel cost (including time) between i and j in minutes 
a and b are parameters 
 
As previously indicated, all trips are assigned to the highway network, reflecting the 
dominance of the auto mode for intercity travel in Portugal. Finally, trips are assigned all-or-
nothing to the shortest path. The all-or-nothing assignment allows us to see the “desired” routing 
of users, which is an important input for the next module (project evaluation). More 
pragmatically, however, our simulation represents intercity links with an average length of 25 
km. Few motorists would in reality re-route on long-distance trips in order to avoid congestion. 
This was verified by comparing the results of the all-or-nothing approach to an incremental trip 
assignment (which accounts for congestion). Only 7 links out of 375 saw a change in trip volume 
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of greater than 250 trips per day, all of them associated with a single bottleneck in the Porto 
metropolitan area. Calibration of the model was conducted using measured vehicle flows 
available for 45 of the 375 links in the network, obtained from EP’s data collection system (15). 
 
Project Evaluation Module 
The project evaluation module enumerates and evaluates each of the possible improvements to 
the national highway network. In any year, there is exactly one project associated with each link 
in the network. Project alternatives are: do nothing, add one lane in each direction, or improve 
design speed one level (i.e., from 60 to 90 kph or from 90 to 120 kph). 
For any given time period there are 375 proposed projects (one for each link). For 
uncongested links with a design speed of 120 kph, the “project” is, by definition, “do nothing.” 
The project evaluation module computes several pieces of information related to each of the 
proposed projects, broadly categorized as costs and benefits. All cost and benefit values used in 
the model are in constant 2008 euros. 
Construction cost is calculated as a function of the terrain, land use, and length of the 
project and is based on approximately 2,000 km of proposed new highway construction cost 
estimation data in Portugal (16), cross-checked against a Washington State DOT survey of 
construction costs in the U.S. (17). Meanwhile, the present value of life-cycle cost is computed 
as the total discounted cost of ownership, including initial construction costs and discounted 
annual maintenance costs. 
Benefits of each project computed within the model include travel-time savings and, in 
some cases, revenues. Travel-time savings for each project can result from congestion reduction 
as well as design speed improvements and are computed over the same time horizon as life-cycle 
costs. The other potential source of project benefits is toll revenues. Tolls typically represent an 
intra-jurisdictional transfer from users to the infrastructure provider and should not be treated as 
a benefit. However, in cases where non-local users are using the facility and contributing toll 
revenues, then toll revenues can be counted as benefits. 
The computation of costs and benefits allows us to construct several metrics: benefit-cost 
ratio, net present value, and financial internal rate of return (IRR). 
 
Strategy Development Module 
The fifth and final module is the strategy development module. Here, agents (infrastructure 
providers) make investment decisions in each project on the basis of the metrics computed in the 
project evaluation module, subject to additional rules which include budget constraints and 
multi-agent negotiations. The outputs of this investment decision-making process are investment 
decisions for each of the proposed projects. 
 The type of agents are determined based on the characterization of ownership structure in 
the strategy development framework. If the ownership structure is a state-owned enterprise, then 
agents represent governments and select projects on the basis of either benefit-cost ratio or net 
present value. If, on the other hand, the ownership structure is concession, then agents represent 
private concessionaires and select projects on the basis of financial IRR. Agents representing the 
government will make investments until their budgets are exhausted, while agents representing 
private concessionaires will only make investments with an acceptable IRR. 
 Agents have resources available to them for investment in the infrastructure network 
which are a function of the type and level of revenues. Alternative revenue types include general 
taxes and user fees (or a mixture of the two). However, the allocation of revenues to agents 
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depends on the number of agents, which is a function of the geographic scale. Alternative 
geographic scales are summarized as follows: 
 National. With a nationally scaled government, there is only one agent making 
investment decisions for all 375 links across the entire nation. 
 Regional. With regionally scaled organizations, there are 5 agents making investment 
decisions only for the links within their region. 
 Municipal. Under this approach, there are 232 agents with decision-making autonomy. 
Their budgets are limited to whatever they collect in tax revenues from their residents and 
in tolls from users of incident links. Since each link is shared by exactly two 
municipalities, any decision to invest in a link must result from a negotiation and 
agreement between the two municipalities that share it. The negotiation process, 
described more fully in (18), involves an iterative bidding process among municipalities 
that ensures no municipality bids or pays more than its benefit for any single project and 
no municipality spends more than its budget on all of its projects. 
 Hybrid. The hybrid approach is similar to the municipal approach, except that 
municipalities share a portion of their revenues equally. Two levels of revenue sharing 
are simulated: 25% and 50%. The mechanism works as follows: municipalities collect 
revenues, but contribute a portion (25% or 50%) of their budgets to a national pool; the 
national pool is then distributed in equal portions to each of the 232 municipalities. 
 Link. This approach is perhaps the simplest. Under a link-based approach, the links 
themselves collect revenues. Toll revenues accrue to a link budget, while tax revenues are 
derived from the residents of neighboring municipalities. Links accumulate budgets and 
invest in projects whenever their budget is sufficient to cover the cost of the 
improvement. Although there are no prospects for this approach in Portugal, it is studied 
here to illustrate the full range of potential strategy development frameworks and their 
relative performance. 
 
Simulation Process 
One cycle through the five modules represents one year in time. At the end of each year, the 
model updates the network to reflect the new design speeds and number of lanes on each link; 
updates the budgets to reflect the amount of money invested as well as any unspent budget that 
can roll over into next year; and prepares the origin-destination matrix and free-flow travel times 
for the next year of the simulation. This process repeats for 14 cycles (14 years). Table 2 
summarizes the variables employed in the various modules of the simulation model. 
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TABLE 2 – Values Used in Simulation Model 
Module Variable Value in model 
Start Year 1995 General End Year 2008 
Design speed – low 60 kph 
Design speed – medium 90 kph 
Design speed – high 120 kph 
Capacity – low speed 1600 pcphpl 
Capacity – medium speed 2250 pcphpl 
Network 
Capacity – high speed 2400 pcphpl 
A 0.005 Travel 
demand B 1.80 
Evaluation time horizon 15 years 
Discount rate 5.0% 
Escalation rate (for value of time and maintenance costs) 1.4% 
Annual maintenance costs as % of construction costs  10% 
Passenger value of time (21) €19.5 / hour 
% of peak-hour traffic in peak direction 65% 
K factor – rural (% of traffic in peak hour) (12) 20% 
K factor – suburban 13.5% 
Project 
evaluation 
K factor – urban 9.5% 
Per capita tax rate – low €39 
Per capita tax rate – medium €65 
Per capita tax rate – high €91 
Toll rate per km – low €0.0166 
Toll rate per km – medium €0.028 
Toll rate per km – high €0.039 
Strategy 
development 
Minimum IRR (source: Brisa Company, unpublished) 10%  
 
RESULTS 
Each simulation run produces a range of outputs, including a record of the evolution of the 
highway network over time (i.e., investments, capacity enhancements, and design speed 
improvements) as well as performance measures such as average network speeds, congestion and 
delay, number of trips, and accessibility. 
As an illustration of the model outputs, Figure 3 shows four maps. Figure 3a is notional 
map of the Portuguese intercity road network as it existed in 1995. Figure 3b is a map of the 
2008 network predicted by the simulation under the actual strategy development framework in 
Portugal, characterized by a nationally scaled state-owned enterprise using a mix of taxes and 
tolls to make investments prioritized by NPV. Figure 3c is a map of the 2008 network predicted 
by the simulation under a municipal alternative framework that is similar to the actual 
framework, with the major exception that it is municipally scaled rather than nationally scaled, 
meaning investments are decided by 232 independent municipal agents rather than a single 
national agent. For comparison, Figure 3d shows the highway network that existed in reality in 
2008. 
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FIGURE 3 – (a) 1995 network, (b) model prediction of network under actual framework, 
(c) model prediction of network under municipal alternative framework, and (d) actual 2008 
network 
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Several distinctions can be observed by visual inspection. Several high-speed corridors 
emerge in Figure 3b under the actual framework, including a new parallel high-speed route 
between Lisbon and Porto, a complete high-speed corridor from Lisbon to Faro, as well as 
several corridors in the northern interior, one linking Porto to the east with Spain, one linking 
Aveiro with Viseu, and a third extending from Santarém to Spain. In reality, each of these 
corridors was improved to motorway quality between 1995 and 2008. In addition, there were 
numerous capacity expansions in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas as well as in and 
around several smaller metropolitan agglomerations between Lisbon and Porto. Between 1998-
2000 the simulation constructed a second crossing of the Tagus River (a high-speed link with 2 
lanes in each direction), connecting Lisbon with the suburbs to the south in Alcochete/Montijo. 
This link represents the Vasco da Gama Bridge, which in reality was completed in 1998. Overall, 
89% of the links predicted in the simulation of the actual framework conform with the links 
observed in reality according to both design speed and capacity. By contrast, the network 
produced by the municipal alternative framework shown in Figure 3c sees no long-distance 
corridors, but rather some locally concentrated improvements in the major metropolitan areas 
and some midsized cities in the interior. 
Table 3 summarizes several key performance metrics for the 2 frameworks (actual and 
municipal alternative) shown in Figures 3b and 3c, including financial metrics, traffic metrics, 
system performance metrics, equity, and others. In addition, we can compare some of these 
metrics with the metrics for the build-nothing scenario. For example, under the actual 
framework, there were 32.6 billion VKT in 2008, a 46% increase over the number of VKT in the 
build-nothing scenario. The actual framework resulted in higher levels of spending than the 
municipal alternative (€10.7 billion compared with €4.7 billion) over the 14-year simulation 
period. Not surprisingly, the actual framework also resulted in a network with less delay in 2008, 
higher peak and offpeak speeds, more stable spending year to year, and higher levels of 
accessibility both in constant terms and relative to the build-nothing scenarios. On the other 
hand, the municipal alternative framework provides more cost-effective delay reductions, a 
closer match of spending relative to population, and a smaller increase in low-speed (highly 
congested) VKT. 
 
Dunn & Sussman  14 
TABLE 3 – Performance metrics for baseline and municipal alternative frameworks 
Performance metric 
Actual framework: 
Value (Change 
from build-
nothing, where 
applicable) 
Municipal 
alternative 
framework: 
Value (Change 
from build-
nothing, where 
applicable) 
Total spending, 1995-2008 (€ billions) 10.7 4.7 
Average annual spending (€ millions) 761 336 
Total VKT in 2008 (billions) 32.6 (+46%) 28.6 (+28%) 
Lane-km built, 1995-2008 714 365 
Average peak speed (kph), 2008 100.6 (+29%) 91.2 (+17%) 
Average offpeak speed (kph), 2008 118.1 (+21%) 114.4 (+17%) 
Total delay (millions hours), 2008 10.7 (-88%) 29.1 (-69%) 
€ spent/hours delay reduced, 1995-2008 130 74 
€ spent/hour delay reduced per 1 billion VKT, 1995-2008 2,790 1,501 
Urban -9.7% -0.8% 
Suburban -2.0% +2.2% Total spending relative to population, 1995-2008 
Rural +11.7% -1.4% 
Peak capacity utilization, 2008 88% (-31) 101% (-40) 
Offpeak capacity utilization, 2008 24% (-14) 30% (-15) 
VKT < 45 kph (millions), 2008 220 (+7%) 200 (+2%) 
Year-to-year spending variability, 1995-2008 10% 45% 
Number of trips (millions), 2008 957 (+42%) 908 (+34%) 
Average trip length (km), 2008 34.1 (+3%) 31.5 (-5%) 
Average peak trip travel time (minutes), 2008 20.3 (-20%) 20.7 (-19%) 
Average offpeak trip travel time (minutes), 2008 17.3 (-15%) 16.5 (-19%)  
 
The performance metrics presented in Table 3 are representative of the 78 total metrics 
available, while the baseline and municipal alternative frameworks are but two of the 105 total 
alternative frameworks tested. The full modeling results consist of a matrix of 78 metrics by 105 
alternative frameworks and, in examining the total set of results, several trends become clear 
(refer to 18 for complete results). In the next section, we derive a more tractable set of results 
from these complete results that can be more easily interpreted for evaluating the alternative 
frameworks. 
 
EVALUATION 
In evaluating the 105 alternative strategy development frameworks, we face not only a range of 
metrics, but also a variety of stakeholders who value each metric in distinct ways, increasing the 
potential for conflict. In order to evaluate a complex system, then, we must consider this 
evaluative complexity (19). Judgment of the quality of any particular framework depends upon 
the values of the stakeholder through whose lenses the outcomes are viewed. 
Determining which among the 105 alternative strategy development frameworks is “best” 
could be straightforward if we were interested in only a single metric, or if the views of only one 
stakeholder were important. For example, the municipal alternative framework described above 
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performs best out of the 105 frameworks tested if we are only interested in measuring the match 
between revenues and expenditures in urban areas. Alternately, we can combine more than one 
outcome of interest into a single metric. For example, the municipal alternative framework ranks 
62nd out of 105 when measured by cost-effectiveness of peak hour speed improvement. 
In the face of this complexity, we created 7 evaluation perspectives, each designed to 
reflect a unique stakeholder perspective: 
 Mobility. Facilitate intercity travel and trade within Portugal. 
 Environmental protection. Preserve the environment by limiting travel and minimizing 
infrastructure development. 
 Economic stimulus. Invest in infrastructure as a means of providing jobs in the short-term 
and enabling economic growth in the long-term. 
 Territorial cohesion. Provide broad access to high-speed intercity travel infrastructure. 
 Urbanization. Relieve urban congestion by providing high-speed, high-capacity intra-
metropolitan linkages to encourage metropolitan growth. 
 Fiscal equivalence. Ensure a distribution of revenues that is equal in proportion to the 
population. 
 Fiscal austerity. Reduce indebtedness by limiting spending in the infrastructure sector. 
For each perspective, a unique set of weights was developed for each performance 
metric, as demonstrated by Brusilovskiy and Hernandez (20). The matrix of performance metric 
values is converted to a matrix of rankings, as shown in Figure 4a. Next, we apply a weight to 
each rank. For example, Figure 4b illustrates the weights for the mobility perspective and the 
rankings for the actual framework (peak speed is weighed 10.5%, and the peak speeds resulting 
from simulation of the actual framework rank 37th out of 105). Next, a weighted-sum ranking is 
computed for each framework (45.1 in the example in Figure 4b). Finally, we can determine 
which strategy development frameworks perform best for each perspective by comparing their 
weighted-sum rankings. For example, Figure 4c shows the top 10 frameworks for the mobility 
perspective. All are either regionally or nationally scaled, while most call for taxes, and all call 
for a medium or high level of revenues. 
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FIGURE 4 – (a) Conversion of performance metrics to ranks, (b) example 
implementation of rank-weight procedure, and (c) top performers for mobility perspective 
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Similar computations were made for each of the 7 perspectives, and the top performing 
framework in each is summarized in Figure 5a. Determining a top single performer across all 
perspectives is difficult, given the evaluate complexity, overlap of constituent performance 
metrics across perspectives, and loss of some information in converting performance metric 
values to ordinal ranks. However, we can gather some understanding of the relative value of each 
framework by measuring performance across all 7 perspectives in several ways and by reporting 
the top several performers. In Figure 5b, we show the top 5 frameworks according to their 
average performance across all 7 perspectives. By contrast, in Figure 5c, we show the top 5 
frameworks according to their best “worst ranking” for any single perspective. Interestingly, the 
same framework (nationally scaled, tax revenues, low level of revenues) was ranked as the best 
in both cases. Next, we discuss some of the key implications of these results.
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FIGURE 5 – (a) Top frameworks for each perspective, (b) overall top frameworks 
measured by average performance, and (c) overall top frameworks measured by highest low 
rank2
                                               
2 In Figures 5b and 5c, the “average performance rank” is the average rank of each framework across all 7 
perspectives. The “worst performance rank” is the lowest rank of a framework for any of the 7 perspectives. This 
explains the decimal value in the average (far left) column and the integer value in the “worst rank” (far right) 
column. In Figure 5b, frameworks are ranked by their average rank, while in 6c they are ranked by their highest 
worst rank. 
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Geographic scale 
Overall, as the geographic scale shrinks (that is, toward smaller decision-making units), the level 
of total investment likewise shrinks. Concurrent with that lower level of investment are more 
modest improvements in such performance metrics as speed, congestion reduction, and 
accessibility. At the same time, however, the restricted investment of decentralized frameworks 
leads to a closer, fairer match of revenues with expenditures (geographically) as well as more 
cost-effective overall investments with regard to congestion reduction, accessibility 
improvements, and travel time savings. Investments in the inter-urban and rural areas do not 
offer the same value along these metrics as investments concentrated in metropolitan areas. 
For the more centralized frameworks (national and regional scales), increases in the toll 
and/or tax rates for revenues lead to a relatively substantial subsequent increase in transportation 
investment. By contrast, the more decentralized frameworks (link-based, municipal, and hybrid) 
are relatively insensitive to increases in toll and/or tax rates. Small, modestly capitalized 
jurisdictions are often unable to overcome the high costs of infrastructure investment even with 
substantial increases in revenues; meanwhile, relatively wealthy jurisdictions can afford to make 
all the improvements available to them with a substantial amount of revenues leftover. 
Moreover, relatively wealthier jurisdictions such as those in the Lisbon metropolitan area have a 
high percentage of pass-through traffic and, particularly in un-tolled frameworks, have no local 
interest in making investments to improve the network. As a result, adding resources to the 
decentralized frameworks (by increasing the tax and/or toll rates) does not necessarily increase 
the amount invested in transportation by the same proportion. 
Non-intuitively, along these lines, strong performance among large geographically scaled 
frameworks (national and regional) is associated with a low rate of revenues, while strong 
performance among small geographically scaled frameworks (link, municipal, and hybrid) is 
more likely to occur with a high rate of revenues. As rates are increased, more jurisdictions are 
able to accumulate the funds necessary to afford infrastructure investments. However, it is 
unlikely that small jurisdictions would be able to tolerate the political cost associated with the 
high tax rates necessary for local infrastructure in modestly populated areas, and the high toll 
rates necessary to generate revenues for infrastructure enhancement would drive away traffic and 
revenue. Indeed, remote jurisdictions with little pass-through traffic stand to benefit most from 
larger geographic scales, while highly populated jurisdictions will see a net transfer of revenues 
to other areas. 
This raises an interesting dilemma for the urban and metropolitan portions of the 
network. Under more decentralized frameworks, urban and metropolitan regions are able to 
invest extensively in inter-urban connections, resulting in some long-distance corridors along 
heavily populated areas such as between Lisbon and Porto. However, because they do not have 
to share excess revenues with other regions, they have more revenues available to devote to other 
areas of need, including internal transportation systems (e.g., high-capacity urban transit). 
 
Ownership structure 
Along the ownership structure dimension, substantial differences are observed between the SOE- 
and concession-based frameworks. Concession frameworks, by design, select only those projects 
with an acceptable predicted financial return for the investor, and do so using direct user fees 
(tolls) as the only revenue source. Simulation of concession-based frameworks replicates major 
portions of the actual real-toll concessioned network in Portugal, particularly the Brisa Main 
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Concession (the most extensive) but also the metropolitan concessions of Lisbon and Porto. If 
the government restricted itself to these investments, the network of motorways in Portugal 
would be much smaller and more concentrated in and around the populated areas than it is today, 
with the only long-distance corridor connecting Lisbon and Porto and, according to the model, 
with a likely extension to Faro in the south. 
SOE frameworks, on the other hand, aggregate revenues through direct user fees and 
general taxes to select projects with acceptable social benefits, regardless of financial return. 
Naturally, the SOE frameworks invest much more extensively than concession frameworks, 
across all geographic scales, due to the lower barrier that social benefits (i.e., travel time savings) 
represent relative to the financial rate of return criteria during project evaluation. 
 
Revenue type 
The simulation results generally suggested that taxes represent a preferred method of revenue 
generation. There are several reasons for the emergence of general tax revenues as preferential to 
tolls. First, tolls discourage travel, thereby reducing aggregate travel demand between 
municipalities. This has the effect of reducing the total number of trips, which reflects poorly 
under evaluation perspectives driven by economic development. Moreover, since toll-based 
frameworks reduce travel and congestion, improvements to the highway network are less cost-
effective with regard to congestion reduction (i.e., there is less congestion to reduce). 
That said, toll frameworks do perform well under several perspectives, including fiscal 
austerity, urbanization, and environmental protection. In part, the strong performance of tolling 
under these perspectives is due to its coupling with concession-based ownership structures. 
 
Other dimensions 
Increasing the level of revenue had a predicable impact on system performance: it increased 
investments. Under geographically decentralized frameworks, the increase in spending was not 
proportional to the increase in revenues. Meanwhile, under larger geographically scaled 
frameworks, increases in revenue led to higher investments, but with diminishing returns (i.e., as 
congestion was reduced and speeds increased, there were fewer benefits to be gained). 
 The investment decision-making criterion (NPV vs. BCR) did not impact the results in a 
meaningful way. It was expected that NPV would direct more resources to more costly projects 
(e.g., those in urban areas), and while this was the case, the magnitude of the difference between 
NPV and BCR frameworks was negligible. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The results confirm that it is feasible to simulate—using real data describing an intercity 
transportation system and an agent-based approach—the emergence and performance of 
infrastructure investments as a function of the strategy development framework. The model 
approach and results to date show promise for informing decision-makers about the 
consequences for transportation infrastructure system performance of strategic decisions related 
to the structure of organizations, collection of resources, and decision-making processes. Such a 
tool is particularly important given the ongoing reorganizations of the Portuguese transportation 
sector, including increasing reliance on concession agreements, highway tolls, and sub-national 
government participation. 
The results tell a useful story with insights such as those noted in previous sections. 
Nonetheless, a range of refinements and improvements can be made, including a more 
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sophisticated demand forecasting module, a wider range of investment decision-making criteria, 
and a more complete physical network that includes competing modes such as conventional 
intercity and regional rail, air, and a proposed high-speed rail system. In addition, there are some 
phenomena that the model does not currently capture (e.g., multi-modal investment criteria and 
explicit consideration of freight traffic) and others that are not strictly quantifiable (e.g., 
politically negotiated investment decisions, competency of organizations at varying scales to 
participate in infrastructure strategy development at all). These considerations are perhaps best 
addressed through supplemental qualitative analysis such as case and stakeholder analysis (see 
18 for further elaboration). Meanwhile, the quantifiable results of the modeling exercise 
presented here have generated a number of results with relevance and applicability to Portugal’s 
current situation as well as to practitioners facing similar questions elsewhere.
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